they are most often older, more experienced men with wife and family. While given a free hand, the mudir is still often on the telephone to Rowanduz, if only to hear the voices of his fellow civil servants, and failing leave to visit Baghdad, Mosul, or some other center of "civilization," seeks every opportunity to find their company in the center itself. "Here I am," said one mudir, "in this village where there is no club, no restaurant, no cinema, and no friends. And after sundown it's all finished."

The mudir and his problems will be found again later, for it is necessary here to return to Rowanduz itself and the more important question of the area as a whole. Of the several government buildings in Rowanduz, that which commands primary attention, as it does of the inhabitants of the district, is the serai, so termed after Ottoman custom, for it contains the offices of the qaimmaqam and most of his staff, and is the physical center of the district government. The serai is one of the first buildings to be encountered in the town, standing a hundred yards from the edge of the bluff and commanding a magnificent view of the valley. It is a large, dun-colored, rectangular structure of plastered brick surrounding a partially paved interior court wherein a few ragged trees are to be found. The front of the building is of two storeys, unlike the other three sides which are of one, and is pierced by a large, arched gateway where one or two policemen mount guard during the day. Within the arch is a long brick bench on which a

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enforced. Of the non-Muslims, the Jews might be mentioned first, and their own custom of marriage is like that of Islam. By long tradition, heightened by the recent Israeli war, the Jews are greatly despised, but most of them have already migrated to their new country. The departure of the Jewish craftsmen and shopkeepers from Rowanduz has already been noticed. Of the Christians, an unconscious distinction is made in the Muslim mind between those who come from the Western world, and those who are native to the area or the Eastern Mediterranean. The military prowess and advanced culture of Europe or America are recognized, and almost any male from these countries is ipso facto an effendi or gentleman. The Briton, because of the part of his country's imperialism in the Middle East, may be disliked, but he is usually respected. On the other hand, Christians such as the Armenians, Chaldaeans, Greeks, and Nestorians, who have been Islamic subjects in the past, are looked upon with some contempt. The Armenians and Greeks are largely urban minorities, engaged in commerce, and are generally vilified, as are Jews and certain Syrians in the cities, as cheats and thieves. The Chaldaeans and the Nestorians, most of the latter displaced from their homeland in Turkey after the first World War, were once exclusively engaged in agriculture, and, as a peaceful folk, were not considered particularly different from Muslim peasants. Kurdish chieftains and their men have been invited to Nestorian festivals and there has been

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nsiderable social intercourse between the two groups. 186 563 571
fortunately, the Nestorians, unable to find land in Iraq,
ok service with the British, particularly in the infantry
vy battalions, and had a part, among other things, in
ushing two Kurdish revolts. There are many of them settled
the Rowanduz area, at Batas, Dara Harir and Dyana, and,
ile outwardly amicable, the Kurds feel toward them a
rtain amount of distrust and, in view of their alliance
th the British, especially in the lucrative occupations
the Iraq Petroleum Company, jealousy. For their part, [167]
e Nestorians live in fear of massacre, and as many as
e able migrate abroad. The Christians of this native [582]
oup are just as adamant in the matter of the marriage of
eir daughters to Muslims as the Muslims are toward them.
e can find Muslims in Baghdad with American, British, or
rman wives, but never Armenian or Chaldaean.

There is a curious sociological fact to be seen here. 627 937 548
uslim girls who become prostitutes (in fact, any Muslim
oman whose reputation has been questioned) are in imminent
anger of being slain by their relatives, and the Baghdad
ress is filled daily with such killings. Thus most of [553]
hem assume Christian names, often of a cinema favorite,
nd wear a cross conspicuously at the throat, changing
utwardly their religion to avoid detection. Islam 771 578
ommands tremendous respect from its followers and is a
"proud" religion, one of warriors and conquerors. A
uslim may be cursed by a non-Muslim to a certain point,

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social exchange, extending beyond the district itself, according to certain alignments. Lali Khan always has a number of visitors, such as Sayyid Ahmad and his brothers, and the same is true, to a lesser extent, of Sadiq Agha. These alignments, spoken of above, are formed on the basis of old feuds, family friendships, political sentiments, and the like. Normally the guests of Sadiq Agha are not to be seen at the House of Isma'il Beg, and the reverse is true, although there need be no ill-feeling between the two groups. To draw up a chart of these matters would be complex and of little value, inasmuch as they are perpetually changing and are vast in number. To give some examples, Karim Agha never visits the House of Isma'il Beg because of a feud, nor those of Sayyid Ahmad and his brothers because the latter are friends of Lali Khan. His own friend, a Hashid Agha (not of Jiadian) calls on Sadiq Agha, but does not visit Lali Khan or Sayyid Ahmad because of his friendship with Karim Agha. Mahmud Beg of the Baradost is friendly with Sayyid Ahmad, but has nothing to do with Sadiq Agha, and hence Karim Agha and his friend, because he does not sympathize with a feud in which Sadiq Agha was involved. To extend the matter further, Karim Agha does not patronize merchants in the bazar who are friends or clients of Lali Khan. Similarly, Sayyid Ahmad, whenever he visits the town, has no traffic with those who favor Karim Agha. The network of friendships and alliances among the aristocracy is an important feature of their life, but it need not extend to the

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advise or scold their employers. 565 [367]

Commoners make up nine-tenths or more of the population of the town. They are, of course, Kurds, and Kurdish is their primary tongue. A number of the older men speak Turkish and Persian, although these are now disappearing, and almost everyone commands a few words of Arabic. Their clothing is in the native style. Their relations with the officials and officers are much more extensive than those of the aristocrats, because many are employed by the government personnel, and are, on the whole, amicable, depending on the personality of the official in question. It has been seen that the doctor and one of the police officers were heartily disliked. It is interesting that officials are referred to much as the local aristocracy. Colonel Khalid Naqshbandi, no aristocrat by birth, was not addressed as officer, but simply as "Khalid Beg," a commander of the "government tribe." [162] [191] [29] 565 571

Among themselves, the townspeople are governed to some extent by their mukhtar, Ra'uf Effendi, and by public opinion. It must be remembered, however, that this is a population of diverse origins, made up of families of the Ottoman town, newcomers from other Kurdish cities, such as Sulaymaniya, and of migrants and transients from the villages. Thus there is little of the solidarity to be found in an agricultural village. It has been noted that there is no mandatory communal labor, such as helping a man build his house, but rather optional neighborhood cooperation. For the townsmen there is no participation in 632 571 571 621 [476]

government, and no civic or charitable organizations, guilds, or clubs. The diwankhana of the aristocrat, as noted, is often used as a man's clubhouse and a sort of village center, but that of Isma'il Beg in the town is rarely so used, and the mosque or the shaykhanas offer little as substitutes. In Rowandus there is thus an aggregate of separate households whose relationships with the government and with each other are largely on an individual basis, and for social life a man depends to a great extent on his relatives and friends. This should not be taken to mean that there is no force to public opinion or community interest. A mutual concern is much in evidence in the public conduct of individuals and in festivals, and a large part of this is furnished by the Muslim faith. In the summer of 1951 a collection was taken up among the townspeople as a pious work for a poor Arab, arrested by the police as a suspected deserter from the army and subsequently released penniless. The effect of public opinion in such matters as the wearing of the veil or smoking on the streets during Ramadan has already been noticed. The distribution of food and clothing to the poor of the town on certain occasions, and other examples of a similar nature, will be encountered in later sections. However, there is no structural bond or concrete rules of membership which cause the townspeople to act as a whole, although such behavior can often be observed.

behavior. The ethnic barrier between the Arab officials and the local inhabitants is by far the most striking. Divisions along lines of locale or tribe have little or no significance for members of the official class, although many of them, especially the Arabs, may belong to the latter type of group, in addition to their local origin. There is a certain amount of banter between natives of Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, or other cities, just as in America much is heard of the rivalry of various cities and states, but it does not operate in any serious way to divide the group. The force connected with tribal affiliations in Iraq appears to be only appropriate in its proper setting, and a pair of officials, members of two tribes engaged in a deadly feud in some rural area, seem to make nothing of it divorced from the actual scene.

Something of the relations of the official class to the aristocracy and the townspeople has already been indicated. While a number of the Kurds may regard the government in a poor light, it would be a mistake to assume that they do not have admiration or fondness for certain of the officials. Conversely, it would be equally erroneous to think that many of the officials do not have a paternal affection for their charges. Nevertheless, the whole theory of personal relations between officials and townspeople is based on the thesis that "familiarity breeds contempt," which has a certain amount of validity. An over-friendly mudir might be looked upon with more suspicion and distrust than one who was comfortably distant. Thus the more

highly ranking civil servants and officers never take refreshment in the shaykhanas or worship in the town mosques. They do not visit the homes of the townsmen or attend their festivals, although, being men of substance, they may send gifts to their Kurdish neighbors on such occasions. The dividing line is to be found in the teachers, who constitute something of a separate group, looked down on by the higher officials and officers and flattered by the townspeople, perhaps, to some extent, because they exercise great control over the destinies of the sons of the town. It is possible to observe a teacher in deep conversation with some respected merchant in the bazar. One must digress to report that one of the teachers in Rowandus fell in love with and married a girl of the town, undistinguished either in the wealth or the occupation of her father, much to the delight of her parents and against the advice and scorn of his colleagues and superiors. This created an anomalous, almost unheard-of situation, breaking down, as it did, the barrier between "educated aristocrat" and commoner, and the teacher is still subject to criticism, not solely on the part of the official class, although he shares much more extensively than his fellows in the social life of the townspeople.

One of the most salient characteristics of the official class is that it considers itself, with some justice, to be the most "progressive" not only in Kurdistan but in Iraq at large. Judged, to a large extent, in terms

with each other in Arabic, heavily interlard their speech with English and French words and phrases. The official class can, with legitimacy, claim that it is the more progressive and better educated, but, as if to drive a wedge between itself and its subjects, the adjective baladi, "rustic," is used with fluency and condemnation. As this new "civil elite" continues to assert itself at the expense of its parallel, the landed chieftains, both Kurd and Arab, Westernization has become one of its distinctive marks. 565 647 177 [192]

Thus thrown back on themselves for these reasons, the distinctions between Arab and Kurd, and between educated and uneducated, and their insistance on "distance," the officials and officers have of necessity created a social life of their own, exclusively masculine. A private home in the upper part of the town, whose garden overlooks the gorge, was subsidized as a nadi or "club." This building is of a single storey, built on three sides about a flagged courtyard which forms the garden, and encloses only several rooms. Its previous occupant had been an educated effendi whose hobbies were the occult sciences, and he decorated the walls with snakes and other symbols in paint which might lead the uninformed observer to erroneous conclusions in the realm of popular religion. One of the rooms was furnished with chairs and benches, much as a diwakhana, another had a table and chairs for cards, and a third was utilized as a kitchen. Two of the townsmen were hired as servants. In the club one might purchase tea, sherbet, and, 571 565 647 563 529 517 [795] [352]

taept God to bring destruction to the owner. In the case of smaller articles, it is more or less mandatory for the owner to present the item in question to the admirer as a gift. A large number of cigarette-lighters, rosaries, walking-sticks, and the like change hands in exactly this fashion. The second is much more marked, the exhibition of deference to a superior or an equal. This can be seen in two persons of equal standing who wish to enter a room, for they will stand before the door, bowing each other in, until one seizes the other by the arm and makes him precede by main force. The same is true of refreshments or tobacco. If one official produces cigarettes, the second will bring out his own and a wrangle usually ensues over ---- -- an exchange. An identical process is gone through in lighting the tobacco, often with grotesque attitudes as two men hold out lighted matches for each other's cigarettes. The Kurdish populace, aristocrats and commoners, are less punctilious in these matters than the officials, and suffer less inconvenience.

To this point the greater part of these remarks have been largely pertinent to masculine society alone, and the investigator confesses to some failing in treating that of women. There are, it seems, certain aspects of feminine society on which the townsmen themselves cannot speak with authority, a deficit of information which could easily be filled by an observer of the female sex. However, it is possible to make a number of valid observations which must

office until further investigation is able to furnish a more complete account. Here in the lowest classes of society, mature women, those of the officials and officers, the aristocrats, and the wealthier townsmen, are generally restricted to the interior of their houses, and seem ons ids freely with society at large. It is more or less inevitable that such women have their friends and visitors among the female relatives of their fathers' and husbands' families, for only these can visit each other's houses without restriction. Because marriages are arranged between persons on a basis of comparable status, a woman's friends, like those of her husband, are close to her in age. However, women of the upper classes are much more reserved in most respects in their demeanor toward inferiors of the same sex than their husbands are toward theirs, and spend long hours in intimate conversation with female servants, seamstresses and laundresses. The latter are, in fact, an important link with the outside world of the town, inasmuch as they are able to intermingle with others of the lower classes and hence provide the mistress of a wealthy household with welcome news and gossip. The lot of the wives of the officials and officers is much more difficult, because their friends and relatives have been left elsewhere in Iraq, and there is almost no means of making new acquaintances in the town. They, too, find pleasure in the conversation of their maids, Arab or Kurd, and, with the knowledge of the husbands concerned, may visit

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the wives of other officials, although this is far from a common practice. The wife of an official can be extremely lonely as far as feminine companionship is concerned. Commoners of the lower classes suffer no such inconvenience, and associate with each other with great freedom. There is a morgue for women alone in the town, frequented by those of the lower classes, and is said by the townsmen to be used more as a clearing-house for idle talk than for plain carnalness.

If the society of adults in Rwanda has its hierarchy, there is a very real, but short-lived, democracy for the children. The youngsters of all officials, aristocrats, commoners, pay [illegible] without any reference to the ranks of their parents, and choose their leaders in the same way. The son of a servant can be "chieftain" over his fellows, and the daughter of a laborer the arbiter of her playmates. This stage passes without any apparent difficulty as the exigencies of life call them to different tasks, some to school and others to work in their fathers' clans. New friendships, better fitted to the demands of relative status, replace those of childhood. It need not be thought, however, that these early alliances do not extend into later life, although such acquaintances do not visit each other's homes.

In concluding this section, it is possible to relate the society of Rwandese not only to that of the town in Ottoman times, but to Iraq and the Middle East at large, and to present several observations of some importance.

their own brothers and sisters was known. The impression 582
the investigator obtained from all of these things was that 586
the patrilineage, expressed in the mal or "house," strongly
governs the lateral calculation of relations to extend or
bounds the kinship group. Marriages undertaken for 581
economic or social advantage add to the divergency, inas-
much as they bring together at one point unrelated groups.
It must be remembered, however, that Rowanduz was re-
settled from various sources after its destruction in the
first world War, and the marriages of its families, many
of them migrants to the town, cannot be expected to show
the characteristics of a similar community whose popula-
tion had been left undisturbed. In the agricultural 621
villages of the district, as one sees, somewhat artificially, 602
that "everyone is related," but one suspects, in view of the 571
importance of the patrilineage and the form of inheritance,
that even in these places marriage characteristically
causes divergence in forming new family or mal-groups, and
the village population is constantly regrouping, rather
than constituting a systematically interrelated whole.

The Kurdish kinship nomenclature, as recorded at 601
Rowanduz, makes systematic use of a limited number of
basic terms. The first group of these, twelve in number,
indicate consanguineal relationships, those held to be
in the "milk" of the mother or in the "blood:"

1. [illegible]	["Old Father"]	Grandfather
2. [illegible]	["Old Mother"]	Grandmother
3. [illegible]	["Father"]	Father
4. [illegible]	["Mother"]	Mother

[Text continues on page 237]

3: Barth E-5 (1951) 1954 MA11 Kurd MA11

the [illegible] exclusiveness of ownership as well as exclusive use. The following discussion will, for the sake of simplicity, relate only to the Hamawands, an independent tribe of population ca. 1800-1900, which became exclusive users over a three generation span.

The lineage organization has two main areas of relevance: land ownership, and defense and offense in war. Property rights in land and grazing area are held jointly by the tribe as a whole; exclusive exclusive rights are vested in its localized segments, subdividing compact villages with a population of 30 to 200 individuals. Within the village territory, men have traditional rights to certain fields. These rights are passed on from father to son, but are not inalienable, and land is freely redistributed by the village council when the need arises. If a segment becomes extinct, its territory passes as communal inheritance to the other segments of the lineage, according to the degree of kinship (in any one level of segmentation, "brothers" exclude "cousins" from inheritance).

Further, until successful pacification in 1932, the lineage was, and still is potentially, also a military unit, mobilized in case if a segment were attacked, from [illegible] according to the segmentary chamber when conflicts were within the group. Conflicts relating to territorial rights were only dangerous within, where they led to fission, and without, where they led to conquest or loss of territory.

There is a close contrast between the Kurdish and most African systems in the manner with which the problems of fusion and fission are solved. A man's rights to land are limited to the territory of the village segment of his lineage; a stranger or a person from another lineage segment is accepted into a village only as hired farm help ("naqarî") of degraded status. The territorial exclusiveness of lineage segments does tends to be maximized to high degree, and there are no kinship mechanisms for developing "stretched" lineages with land ownership and political rights.[1] The segmentary nature of the territorial lineage segments itself directly in geographical distribution, and the respective territories of major and minor segments, inhabited nearly exclusively by them, down to the village level, can be plotted on a map or clearly seen when one has a view of the valley bottoms. The main integrative factors relevant to segments larger than the village seem to be territorial contiguity, knowledge of common descent, and the importance of the tribe as a defensive unit—this last probably being of most weight. No religious or ritual

[1] A prominent scholarship may occasionally be established between a competing lineage group and a weakened, non-tribal peasant population, who needs certain rights as serfs of the ruling lineage. In these cases, a new kinship is set up, presenting knowledge between the two groups. This relationship, observed on the southern margins of Hamawand territory, does not seem to be very stable.

3: Barth K-5 (1951) 1954 MA11 Kurd MA11

No religious ceremonial 571

exchanges exist for bringing together any group larger than the village, and no symbiotic relations of a practical or ritual nature have been developed.

This organizational form is associated with a strong emphasis on the father's 582
brother's daughter as preferred spouse, and marital residency to close family re-
degrees. The strength of emphasis is indicated by (1) expressed norms, (2) rela-
tive brideprice, and (3) actual statistical occurrence.

(1) Informants agree that parental cousins have first rights to a girl, and 583
where the father of a girl contemplates giving her in marriage to anyone else, the 579
parental cousin must first release her by renouncing his claim. Cases of violation 583
resulting from breach of this obligation on the part of the father were collected
in the field and have been recorded by others in the literature.[1] Giving one's
daughter to a brother's son is further considered thoughtful and proper: the
father knows his daughter's spouse well, and will also be able to exert some control
over his actions toward her after marriage; marriage should be between equals,
and no one is closer in access and sentiments than a parental cousin. Small chil-
dren are pleasantly entertained when teased for being "in love" with their paren-
tal cousin. The importance of endogamy in maintaining family property is also 582
recognized, though the problem only arises with any degree of gravity where Koran 583
rules favor of inheritance, giving stipulated fractions of the estate to female
descendants, are strictly followed, and this does not generally seem to be the case.

(2) It is an agreed privilege for parental cousins, in low estate also other near 585
kin, to receive the girl at a reduced bridepriice. The normal bridepriice for village 582
girls ranges between $50-150. Parental cousins generally pay only wedding
expenses.

(3) The actual frequency of father's brother's daughter, and other cousin, 582
marriage is high, apparently ranging around fifty percent. The degree of relation-
ship between all living spouses in two normal sized Hamawand villages fell into
the following categories:

Fa and Ma						
FaBrDa (cousin)	MaBrDa (kinless)	SiDa (cousin)	Other relative	Unrelated, in village	Other village	Total
9	1	2	3	2	4	21

Taking the normal fluctuations in size and sex distribution of sibling groups
into account, this probably approximates the maximal frequency that marriage
with actual, non-classificatory parental cousin can reasonably attain.

1 Eg. W. R. Hay, Two Years in Kurdistan (London, 1921), p. 71.

3: Barth E-5 (1951) 1954 MA11 Kurd MA11

Where the cost of marrying an unrelated, "stranger" girl is so high and the economic preference for cross-kin clear, the inducement for the young man to seek a bride among his cousins is evident. Consequently, the young men make the "right" choice though they appear subjectively to feel, and invariably express the opinion, that they are entirely free to seek any bride they might wish. The problem in this situation centers around what the motivation of the girl's father is, that he should forego his right to a bridegiven which, to the Kurdish farmer, constitutes a minor fortune. Or put somewhat differently, the central problem is: what are the advantages gained in this system by giving one's daughter to a brother's son which compensate one for the loss of the bridegiven.

The answer would seem to lie in the political structure. In the Kurdish lineage system, all groups are subject to a constant pressure towards segmentation and fission, counterbalanced by the interlocking circles of identification normally operational with segmentary descent systems (among the Nuer, territorial vs. descent groups; cross-cutting age-grades; among Tallensi, further the close collaboration between lineages, etc.). This pressure is painfully evident in factional activity within the villages, and emerges in all four-level descriptions of Kurdish life.* Kurdish villages are characterized by a constant struggle for political power on the part of a majority of the adult men, at times even women. Such political power is proportional to the number of alliances one can mobilize to support one's claims. In a patrilineal lineage system, a man can expect political support only from his agnatic relatives, those who by descent belong to his political sub-sections; and the factions in the village tend to be alignments of the younger men of a small lineage segment around an elder leader. These segments consist primarily of brothers, sons, and brothers' sons. The solution to the latter is most critical: it crosses the first potential line of cleavage between collateral branches. If a man alienates his nephews by refusing them their traditional rights, he loses their political support. If he, on the other hand, gives them his daughters in marriage, the ties are reinforced and lineage solidarity maintained. The girl's father creates an obligation on the part of his brother's son to give him political support by exempting him from paying the bridegiven. No other son-in-law can, in the lineage system, fill this role as political supporter, consequently they must invariably pay bridegiven. The transaction may thus be regarded as constituting a type of delayed exchange: the father receives political allegiance in his lifetime from his brother's son in return for the daughter which he gives him. In this way, the payment of preferential father's brother's

* Eg. C. J. Rich, Narrative of a Residence in Koordistan (London, 1836); E. B. Soane, Through Mesopotamia and Kurdistan in Disguise (London, 1926); Hay, op. cit.

Another marriage serves to reinforce the political implications of the lineage system.

As regards being restricted geographically there was no seclusion for educated urban women, though in its "transportable" form seclusion existed, for the wearing of over-garment and veil was obligatory. Just as the geographical form of seclusion applying to the women of the village aristocracy was elastic, certain categories of males outside the immediate family circle being admitted to the women's domain, so also was the "transportable" seclusion, for the degree of veiling depended upon the man meeting the woman. If the man was a stranger, say the post-office clerk, bank teller, or bus driver, complete veiling was maintained. The men on their side accepted it as perfectly natural that women whom they served or bargained with were completely anonymous and, apart from the voice, unidentifiable. Before superiors, for example the educational authorities or officials like the mayor of the town, my interpreter pushed back her veil though at the same time holding the front edge of the over-garment which goes over the head, so closely together that only a small part of her face was visible. This was the case on more official visits, but also on ordinary visits the tightly-drawn veil and the pushed-back veil were retained. This I saw on a visit to Sheikh Mahmoud's son. On this occasion my interpreter had decked herself out in all the finest articles of clothing and jewellery the women of her family could together produce. During the visit not the slightest glimpse of all this magnificence was disclosed. Perhaps this was due to the fact that, in addition to us, two male agricultural experts were present, who seemed to have come to discuss questions in connection with the rice harvest that year.

When dealing with traders in the city, for example in the cloth booths in the vaulted arcades, the women also pushed back their veils. Here they apparently faced men in a position subordinate to them, and could allow themselves to show a small expanse of face through the closely-held veil.

In the Bakhtiari closets, both the vaulted and the roofless, it would have been quite unthinkable for the women, even though closely veiled, to sit in the ordinary oasis. The men sat there. For the women and the men of their family who accompanied them there were boxes with special entrances and a curtain. This curtain was not drawn aside until the theatre was dark, and was again drawn at the interval. Men in the audience must not obtain a glimpse of the women in the box.

In her outside life and during work the educated urban woman came into contact with the men's world. Sympathy between two young people might be aroused and a marriage based on personal contact and sentiment would result. However, there was no direct proposal on the part of the young man. The obligatory procedure was marriage negotiations between the women of the two families, followed by the matter being placed before the father for decision (see p. 119). Whereas the work of an educated urban woman provided her with a radius of action far outside the boundaries of the home, in non-working hours she was to be found in the precincts of the home. In leisure hours there were no mixed groups of men and women. Men, on the other hand, spent their free time in the streets or in tea houses in company with other men. Here again there was a strict division between the worlds of men and women.

Thus, like her humble village sister, the educated urban woman possessed a freedom of movement that extended just as far as, but no further than, her work outside the home justified, but, as opposed to the village women, the educated urban women practised a transportable seclusion in the form of *chādr* and veil. This, like the seclusion of the aristocratic village women, possessed a certain elasticity in regard to certain male categories.

562 In none of the three female environments so far considered was the idea of liberty understood in the same way as it is in the West.

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562 In the fourth and last female environment, the uneducated urban milieu, the veiling was obligatory.
369 As opposed to their educated sisters the uneducated also maintained seclusion. Nothing in their daily
591 activities brought them into contact with the man's world. Household purchases were attended to by
the husband. I was also told that goods connected with dress were bartered from house to house by
women. However, women's sealed-off world was not confined to the home, for all women's apart-
[594] ments in the town were in contact with each other. A stream of female visitors entered the home, the
women of which frequently visited other homes. Under cover of transportable seclusion there was
considerable freedom within the urban woman's world. In consequence, uneducated women in towns
obtained an opportunity of contact that lay on a quite different social plane from that applying
to the three other feminine milieus. Among humble village women the same possibility naturally
applied. Here, however, it took place just as much at watering and washing places, etc., less in the
homes. In the uneducated feminine milieu in Kurdistan, subjected to the veil and seclusion, a decisive
barrier existed between the men's and women's worlds, not only in leisure but also in working hours.

591 For a man married to one or two wives in the uneducated woman's milieu in a town like Sulaimani,
595 one found what Ubergi[1] describes as typical of a Turkish home: "for an Oriental his home is the
place where his wife and children are, and where he eats his meals and spends the night .... his real
home is either his shop or his favourite café, where he meets the people whose company constitutes
his spiritual content ....".

562 In the uneducated feminine environment in Sulaimani as represented by my interpreter's home,
352 with its two wives whose sphere of work fell within the framework of the home, the actual place of
work could, exceptionally, be moved to the female area of another home. When baking a larger
supply of bread, the dough for which was prepared by an outside woman who arrived at dawn, the
two housewives later in the morning transferred the actual operation to the home of a neighbour.
Here there was a modern, jar-shaped clay oven that could be used by several women simultaneously.
This was more effective than the convex iron sheet laid over the fire that sufficed for daily needs.

562 Visits and return visits constituted the social contact with the outside world. In my experience the
574 educated women in the home only made purchases in the city and then only of material, sweet, of
443 meat and vegetables. As mentioned, the daily household purchases were made by the husband and
delivered by small boys, of whom there were swarms, who in this way contributed towards their keep.
That women did not shop at the meat and vegetable stalls was not considered as any form of oppression,
in fact my impression was precisely the same as Wiedemann's, who writes: "... as a rule the conser-
vative Moslem woman in the past did not do her own shopping .... For the women of the past, their
lack of freedom for personal shopping was doubtless not regarded as an infringement on their liberty
[or] a [inconvenience][2]".

562 An investigation as to which men beyond the immediate family circle had access to the homes of
423 uneducated urban women disclosed that certain traders or artisans were admitted. A half-blind ice-

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With the introduction of monogamous marriage and divorce that not only got rid of the wife, but also dissolves the children's home, a phenomenon hitherto unknown will arise in Kurdistan and other Islamic areas that are copying our pattern of culture, the solitary mother: on the one hand the solitary divorced mother, and on the other, the result of women's entry into the labour market, the solitary unmarried mother.

Although it has been maintained from several quarters[1] that the veil and seclusion, women's withdrawn social position, were originally foreign to the Arabs and to Mohammed, and were first adopted by Islam when the Arabs came into contact with the Greek-Hellenic, Byzantine culture, the fact remains that this retired status obtained religious sanction from Sura 24, verse 31 of the Koran. Consequently, the veil and seclusion are as much a religious as a secular matter. The law of Islam *Sari'a*, goes far deeper than does Roman law. The ordinances of the Koran, the whole *fiqh* system, comprises every detail of existence, and constitutes a practical guide, a pattern of behaviour[2]. The restrictions resulting therefrom were maintained by Kurdish women in Iraq with the greatest seriousness, respect and care in all four feminine milieus.

In general, attention has been paid to the fact that women in Muslim homes where seclusion was maintained to a greater or lesser degree, were confined to certain parts of the home. There is therefore reason to point out that the men may equally well be said to be excluded from the women's apartments of all the other homes he may visit. In Kurdish villages only the guest room, a part of the squire's home, was open to him. In towns he was permitted to enter the guest room (without a glance at the courtyard) and to leave the house again just as discreetly. The core of the home was the forbidden area; the women there were the people he was not allowed to see. From the time a boy passed a certain age, a wall was suddenly raised between him and the women's world; he was shut out and reduced to the society of other men and the streets. The women belonging to his own home formed an exception.

The banks, post offices and public offices I visited were as gloomy and shoreless as barracks. A chair at a street corner or a tea house bench was the restrictive world to which a male was relegated on reaching manhood. It seemed to me that the men in their male world did not thrive as much as did the women and children in their half of society. Sometimes or other the women seemed to have discovered a more lively and friendly social convivium between themselves than had the men, or, for that matter, than we have in the West. Under cover of the veil women were able to move about in the men's world. Outside the home their world was not devoid of men to the same extent that the men's world was devoid of women. Even though women were veiled in the street they were able to see. In many cases they were also able to talk, trade and bargain with men in the city, in banks and in post offices. They could see whom they were addressing; men saw only a black veil.

In view of the great part that conformance with the rules of Islam played in the life of Kurdish women, her positive attitude to the five pillars of Islam (see chapter V), any change in her life pattern in this quarter would involve a complete transformation. It is not surprising that the altered life of women in Turkey has led to personal bond in bond with a emotional offensive on all things Arab and

sacred powers of the darwish and the practical powers of the political leader; both as equally potent in the ritual situation, and their character may be covered best by the concept of personal charisma.

THE FEAST

The feast occupies a very prominent place in the communal life of the village and is regarded as an active agent in producing solidarity and unity, as well as being a symbol of such unity. The fact of eating together in itself produces certain mutual obligations and solemnizes feelings of sympathy. The Bedouin ideal, that any person with whom you have eaten is inviolable for a minimum period of time, is not actually applied in Kurdish territory, but is well known and approved of as being highly ethical. Essentially similar, though less formal, obligations are implied in the Kurdish concept of sharing ch bread.

Furthermore, the feast is a forum for conspicuous consumption, and thus give the host an opportunity to display his wealth, and to create and re-affirm ties of friendship by generosity. Thus the person who gives the feast can enhance his prestige in the village considerably hospitality is an integral aspect of the Kurdish ideal of a man, conversely, a person with a reputation for miserliness suffers corresponding loss of prestige.

A feast in some form or another is thus a fairly frequent occurrence in the villag. Since it will involve at least a major part and usually the whole of the village, it provides one of the major occasions in which leadership and moderate rivalry is expressed, and in which the relative prestige and constituent units assume political significance. Essentially, these feasts are of two major types, (1) connected with religious festivals, or (2) marking transitions of status in the life cycle of members of the society.

Religious festivals. In some villages, the whole of the holy month of Ramadan is celebrated by regular communal evening meals at the mosque or in the village square. In this arrangement, either each household may in turn serve as hosts for the whole village, or each family brings its own food. Only the men partake in the meal; for them, it becomes a social occasion of major importance. The feast

563 In summary, the following diagram (No. 9) suggests the relative
643 positions of various social categories in the village hierarchy, and
554 their approximate spread on an ordinate of slow-high — obviously a very impressionistic diagram, for illustrative purposes only. Different part-statuses that do not overlap in their spread on the low-high



Diagram No. 9. Relative status of some social categories.

axis are incompatible; furthermore, the mullah often are being fully integrated in the community, there will be a lower frequency of combination of the status of mullah with the other, theoretically compatible, part-statuses.

PRECEDENCE IN LOYALTIES

• 571 In some conflict situations, any specific individual may be faced with a choice as to which group or person he should support — primarily the alternatives of lineage group vs. lord, lineage group

7: Barth E-S (1951) 1953 MA11 Kurd MA11

vs. local community, and questions of kin loyalties and loyalty to 571 •
the person of the leader. This precedence in loyalties, that is, the relative degree of identification with various categories or groups, clearly demonstrates the fluidity of the Kurdish village hierarchy. The group or institution embodying the most power seems invariably to be adhered to, and loyalties shifted accordingly. This in no way means that the Kurdish villager may not be fired with idealism, and die to arms for such ideals or for individuals in the face of great odds. The generalization is concerned with a much more fundamental level. The usual anthropological model of society hypothecates a tendency to restore social equilibrium, and pictures social action as brought to bear on any disturbance so as to compensate for its effect and remove it. In the Kurdish system, this would not always seem to be the case. If a social relation breaks down, there is no systematic or communal effort to restore the former status quo. When the breakdown is within the village community, the factions involved will tend to avoid contacts, and struggle till a new balance is established, or till the smaller group or group in opposition breaks out, migrates or forms a new village. If the breakdown were between villages, social relations would be completely severed, feud or at least considerable talk of feud would ensue, smaller incidents might continue for a long period of time. Trade would take a different course, and new contacts be established.

A disturbance that causes a change in some factor thus leads to an adaptation of the whole system to the new situation. There seems, in the autonomous Kurdish system, to be no conception of the need for concerted communal action to restore a normatively or legally defined «right» state; in that sense, all persons with power are usurpers, on all levels. There are no unquestioned normative, much less supernatural sanctions defining rights and privileges; the situation is much more one of a *modus vivendi*, where every person is given an area of «free grace» in Max Weber's terms (cf. p. 10), in proportion to his power position in the village hierarchy. The rebellion or conflict results where either the subject individuals do not recognize or are suspicious of the actual status and powers of the superordinated person, or where the latter incites a person or group against

• 57 him by overstepping his «reasonable» area of free grace in his relation to them.

In thinking about social relations, this essentially involves substituting the word «reasonable» for «right» — the latter being rigid and absolute, the former being defined in terms of numerous considerations of the specific situation. Obviously, different individuals with different temperament, experience, and values will have various ideas of what is «reasonable» — consequently, any type of superordination that does not involve constant face-to-face relations with the subordinates must be an uneasy one — hence the importance of the bodyguard-corps for the more minor Kurdish leaders.

In the case of conflicting loyalties, the specific situation in the village and area concerned decides which group identification takes precedence. This is clearly illustrated in choice between identification with, or loyalties to, the landlord, the lineage or kin group, and the village community. How completely considerations of power override general rules of loyalty is finally illustrated by conflicts within the family of the old Baban Pasha.

571 422 424 *Lineage group vs. lord.* In the Kurdish tribal system, genealogical and local groups coincide, and these groups are also the organizational units in a formal political sense. A somewhat similar correspondence is characteristic of the non-tribal peasant villages. Thus, since they coincide, the relative importance of the identification with the kin group and with the political unit, as personified by the political officeholder or lord, can not easily be determined. Only in the rather unusual cases where the two are different, do problems of identification and precedence arise.

573 422 An example of the relative powers of the landowner vs. the lineage leader is offered by the Barzi Gawra group, which on the land of Shaikh Mahmud as tenant farmers. The Barzi Gawra are one of ten branches of the *Mewasi tira*, the *Ratz* of which is Said Ali Khabat of Sulaimani.

Formally, the position of the *Ratz* is quite similar to that in other *tira*, though more directly dependent on «democratic» approval. Succession is decided by a council of the important men of the two villages. This council is limited by informal controls, being open to

any one of the *five* who «feels important enough». The qualifications 571 ●
of the *Ra'is* are that he must be experienced, old, and rich (receiving 422
no remuneration for his services), and in fact be acclaimed by a majority of his followers. His field of power, on the other hand, is minimal, and concerns only the relations between the various Memmi villages. Considering that these are spread over a large area, and that the *Ra'is* has no way of enforcing his decisions, he constitutes little more than a mediator in intra-tribal affairs.

Two of the Memmi villages lie on the land of Shaikh Mahmud, 571
and are as completely under his control as are his non-tribal tenants. Shaikh Mahmud freely appoints the village headman himself, and collects the normal shares in tax — according to one critical old woman of the village, he frequently takes considerably more too! In the rather inconceivable case of conflict between the *Ra'is*, with no formal powers, and Shaikh Mahmud, with the power to evict and fine the villagers, there is little doubt whose orders would be followed. The Shaikh even has the primary loyalties of many of the Barzi — the most succinct statement of the Kurd's attitude to his leader was made by the farmer-mullah of the village: «When Shaikh Mahmud was a religious leader, I was a mullah. He became King, I became a riflemen. Now he is a landowner, I am a farmer.» This does not leave very much to the *Ra'is*.

There is thus a contradiction between the feudal hierarchy of which Shaikh Mahmud is the head, based on considerations of locality and economic relations, and the genealogically defined tribal organization, relating these two villages to the other Memmi villages. This lineage organization is still retained, and headed by the *Ra'is*. But the content of the *Ra'is*'s power is minimal, whereas the landowner's *de facto* power is necessarily considerable; the presence of these de facto powers has been fully recognized, and loyalties shifted accordingly. Because of the rigidity of the Kurdish lineage system, no modification of its form has been possible; the field in which it is relevant has simply been reduced.

In effect, this may also be seen as a situation of conflict between two *leaders*, each heading an organization. Since organizational hierarchies are in terms of individuals and not abstract offices, the

• 571 position of the leader becomes crucial. In the present case, the one leader clearly has more status ad power that the other, and identification is with the leader with te highest status.

Within the tribal lineage groups, examples of such identification with *leaders* rather than genealogical groups in abstracto can be multiplied. In various conflicts tribes will split and align in terms of outstanding leaders, disregarding the genealogical ties. The *Hamawands* after the First World War partly sided with Shaikh Mahmoud, partly with the British; the same conflict found the leaders of the *Jaf* confederacy, the *Begzada*, divided into two factions, each with their following (Lees, op. cit.) In the non-tribal areas, larger scale kin organizations are lacking, ad such choices do not arise in the same way. In summary, it seems that in situations of choice, any actual organization, as personified in the leader, takes precedence over abstract genealogical alignments. Where also these genealogical alignments are systematized into an actual organization, a lineage, the choice seems to be made on th basis of a relative evaluation of the status and power of the two competing leaders.

Lineage group vs. village community. In certain situations, the lineage or kin group and the village do not coincide, and a conflict of loyalties may result. In sch cases, the village community seems to take precedence. From th tribal system, the case of feud summarized in Appendix II may serve as an example. The originator of the feud is genealogically more closely tied to the village of his victims than to that in whic he is residing; yet, he can count on his village of residence for tax support. In the archaeological excavations, where workmen from several villages were brought together, the various cleavages would allow community lines; and laborers, genealogically unconnected wih the Hamawand landholding farmers who dominated the villages, could invariably side with the village in which they resided.

In the non-tribal, tenant villages, kinship tends to set the factional patterns of alignment within he community; but in no case would it seem possible for kinship ties crossing village boundaries to override village identification in a situation of conflict. Where the two differ, the community factor takes precedence over the genealogical factor

in determining loyalties. This, it should be emphasized, is true of the[7]1 ●
village, but does not apply to the absentee landowner class, who, in an urban or semiurban setting and with widely dispersed property, have nothing corresponding to the unequivocal community membership of a village.

This primary identification with the village community is utilized for integrative purposes in the non-tribal tenant villages, where kinship-patterned factionalism would otherwise be rabid. It is a very characteristic pattern, noticed by numerous travellers, that every Kurdish village has one or more special «enemy» villages, towards which considerable hostility is expressed — quite out of proportion to the actual grievances between the two communities. The tenant villages lie in the zone where external administration is most completely established, and consequently village unity, for defence or other purposes, is rarely called for. This standardized hostility towards an opposing community undoubtedly serves as a mechanism to mobilize the primary village identification, and thus overrule or limit kin group factionalism.

Class **and** *loyalties.* Identification and loyalty would thus seem to follow the patterns of power distribution fairly closely, and be adapted or transformed when changes in the power distribution require. This follows from the general elements of fluidity and adaptability in the whole village structure. Rigid and absolute identification and loyalty to abstract categories could not fit such a fluid system; identification must be with an actual, existing organization of individuals, and loyalties have to be adjusted according to the changing constellations of these individuals.

In a situation of stress, therefore, even the closest kinship ties may be superseded by considerations of power alignments — among the most graphic examples are the conflicts between close relatives in the family of the old Bohtan Pashas. Here struggle and bloodshed between brothers was endemic, and a history of the administration becomes a chronicle of constant battles between competing pretenders.

Nikitine (*op. cit.*, pp. [illegible]) gives an extremely illuminating day-by-day account of the rupture between Mahmoud Pasha and his brother Osman Bey — easily produced by Turkish intrigue, in spite

9 - Swedish Kurds

• 51; of the unquestionable integrity of both brothers, and their desperate efforts to resist. The account follows the development from Osman Bey demanding his brother from abdicating in his favor, through his efforts later to resist Turkish pressures, when he «had a kind of determination and fierceness, like a man who has set his back against the wall» (p. 111) till finally open conflict resulted between the brothers, and Osman Bey was reduced to a puppet in the hands of the Ottoman Pasha of Baghdad. Rich describes his last conversation with Mahmoud Pasha: «I told him ... that nevertheless I prayed God for the prosperity and strength of his family and country. He said neither could ever be strong, while so many powerful members of the family existed. I insisted that it might be. 'Yes' said he, 'if God sent a plague among us and only left one alive'» (p. 123).

851 554 *Loyalty to leader.* In spite of what has been said, loyalties may remain with a leader after his defeat, when the actual organization of which he is the head is greatly reduced in power, and he himself, as was frequently the case, in exile across the border. This refers to the distinction made between the «ideal» and «de-facto» hierarchy (p. 94 ff). For example in Judean times, one Pasha might be dethroned in favor of an other through the intervention of Ottoman or Persian armies. In such cases, the old leader would often retain his high prestige and status in the ideal hierarchy, though he controlled little de-facto power at the moment; once the external force were removed, he would then be able to regain ascendancy.

In a wider application, this means that the relative power by which competing leaders are evaluated, and which forms the basis for transfer of loyalties, is to considerable extent what I have called the person's ability to rally supporters, i. e. his individual status in the ideal hierarchy, not the de-facto power he controls qua office-holder. The apparent contradiction between the above pattern of transfer of loyalties, and the at times heroic loyalty to a leader in the face of great adversity, stressed in Kurdish tales and chronicles, thus disappears. Such examples of stubborn loyalties indicate situations of wide discrepancy between the «ideal» and the «de-facto» power hierarchies.

10-Johnson G-8 (no date) 1945 MR.11 Kurd MR.11
Iraq

149 climbed on foot up the steep hillsides with an agility quite equal to my own. On another occasion I saw a villager alleged to be 120 years old, whose age must certainly have exceeded 100 years. He had a son aged 100 by a wife whom he had married in later life. This healthy longevity is the result of simple and clean living, which is common in Kurdistan.

To the stranger the Kurd may appear 167 dour and surly—like the Scot—but within 181 his exclusive circle he is smiling and talkative with a childlike lack of discretion: the grossest secret is common knowledge within the tribe. The Kurd has learned

[text continued on p 389(B)]